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1. Introduction 
 
At the end of the 1990s there was widespread disappointment with aid and with what aid had 
achieved. Poverty was still rampant, and growth rates in many poor countries were still low, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. The lack of coherence with other policies of the rich 
countries, in particular trade, migration and security policies and the negative effects of the 
war on drugs are important factors in explaining the possible lower aid effectiveness. This 
paper, however, focuses on the lack of coherence within aid policies, and examines in 
particular the new aid paradigm that was adopted around the year 2000.  
 
The disappointment about what aid had achieved led to several new initiatives at the turn of 
the millennium. There was broad consensus that aid levels should increase, and that aid 
should be more focused on poverty reduction. The international community adopted the 
Millennium Development Goals in order to focus development efforts on achieving concrete 
results. Several summits confirmed commitments to increase the level of aid, for example the 
2002 Monterrey Conference and the 2005 Gleneagles G8 summit. In 1999, the initiative for 
the Heavily Indebted Poor countries (HIPC) was expanded, making larger amounts of debt 
relief accessible to more countries. 
 
At the same time, however, it was recognized that fundamental changes had to be made in the 
way aid was provided. There were basically two criticisms to existing aid practices. One was 
directed against the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s and their 
conditionality. These programs were blamed to have caused a worsening of social indicators, 
while there were also doubts about the effects of these programs on economic growth. In 
addition, the conditionality was often not effective in the sense that the agreed reforms were 
not implemented. The second critique on aid practices concerned project aid, which was still 
the dominant aid modality. The proliferation of projects and of donors, all with their own 
implementation units and their own procurement, accounting and reporting requirements had 
not only put an enormous burden on recipient countries but had also undermined local 
systems for planning and implementation. 
  
These criticisms gave rise to a “new aid paradigm” that was expected to raise aid 
effectiveness. In response to the lack of effectiveness of policy conditionality, donors began 
to stress the need for selectivity in the aid allocation, only providing aid to countries with 
(proven) good policies and good governance. This selectivity would allow for another key 
element of the new aid paradigm, namely national ownership of recipient countries over their 
development strategies and over the aid process. Countries that wished to qualify for the 
enhanced HIPC initiative and also more generally for the IMF and World Bank facilities for 
Low Income Countries had to elaborate a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The 
strategies should be broadly owned, comprehensive, long-term and results oriented, and 
should form the basis for partnership with donors. It was expected that once these PRSPs 
existed, it was no longer necessary for donors to design aid projects. This move from project 
aid to program aid, and in particular budget support, is the third element of the new aid 
paradigm. It was expected to address the problems of project aid: the high transaction costs 
and the weakening of domestic systems. It would also foster government leadership over the 
aid process. 
 
Many of these principles of the new aid paradigm were formalized during a high level 
meeting of more than 100 donors and recipient countries in Paris in 2005. This “Paris 
 
 
1
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness” included the following five principles (High Level Forum, 
2005): 
 
• Ownership: Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development 
policies and strategies and coordinate development actions; 
• Alignment: Donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national 
development strategies, institutions and procedures; 
• Harmonization: Donors’ actions are more harmonized, transparent and collectively 
effective; 
• Managing for results: Managing resources and improving decision-making for results; 
• Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for development results. 
 
These principles are in line with, and build on the principles of the PRSP approach. The Paris 
Declaration sees broadly-owned national and sector development strategies, translated into 
results oriented plans, as the basis for achieving national ownership and leadership of the aid 
process, and for improving donor alignment and harmonization. The Paris Declaration 
stipulates that by 2010, 66 per cent of all aid would have to be given in the context of 
“program based approaches”, meaning that there is leadership by the host country, a single 
comprehensive program and budget framework, harmonization of donor procedures, and 
efforts to increase the use of local systems (High Level Forum, 2005).1 Budget support is 
considered the most advanced aid modality within such approaches. 
 
It was expected that applying these principles, in combination with more aid, would help 
achieving poverty reduction and more in particular the MDGs. A decade later it is clear that 
progress towards the MDGs is mixed. Especially Sub Saharan Africa lags behind. The 
question is whether and to what extent this can be blamed to aid practices. This paper assesses 
to what extent the different elements of the new aid paradigm have been implemented in the 
past decade, and what the results have been. But before doing so, it is important to examine 
whether this new aid paradigm was the right answer to the observed problems of aid 
effectiveness.  
 
The paper begins by scrutinizing the contents of the new aid paradigm itself, showing that it 
contains errors of commission and of omission: it has several internal contradictions, and it 
left some important problems unaddressed. Sections 3, 4 and 5 analyze the extent of 
implementation and the results of the three main elements of the new aid approach: 
selectivity, the use of PRSPs as means to promote ownership and to focus on poverty 
reduction, and the Paris Declaration and the move to budget support as a means to foster 
ownership, harmonization and alignment. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. The new aid approach: expectations and limitations 
 
Origins 
In 1998, the World Bank published a study that would become very influential (World Bank, 
1998). It had two main conclusions. The first was that aid is more effective in a good policy 
environment, and the second that policy conditions of donors are not very effective. Countries 
only implement what they intend to do anyway, and political economy factors determine what 
                                                 
1 Aid within program based approaches may include project as well as program aid. Program aid is unearmarked 
aid and budget support is one of its modalities. 
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is eventually implemented. This second conclusion was in line with much other contemporary 
research, and led to the conviction that policies should be “owned” by recipient countries. The 
first, however, was severely criticized as being on shaky econometric grounds.2 Yet, it led 
many donors to adopt the principle of selectivity in their aid allocation, providing aid only to 
countries with good policies and good governance. In addition, aid’s effectiveness for poverty 
reduction was expected to increase by providing aid only to the poorest countries. 
 
Figure 1.  
 
 
Change in international aid
architecture around 2000
Aid fatigue, persistent poverty
High debts and
NGO campaigns for relief
Failure of project aid:
Transaction costs
Undermining of capacity
Failure of structural adjustment:
Conditionality not effective
Neglect of social sectors
Low growth rates
More aid;
More poverty focus: MDGs
PRSP with national ownership
as condition for HIPC
More program aid for
harmonization and alignment
More selectivity
….
 
 
 
It was hoped that more selectivity “ex post”, on proven levels of policies and governance, 
would also reduce the need for conditionality “ex ante” and so bring about more ownership. 
Broad-based ownership of recipient countries of policies and of aid processes was considered 
important because it would secure commitment and thereby foster policy implementation and 
aid effectiveness. 
 
When the debt campaigners were successful in achieving more extensive debt relief for the 
poorest countries, a broad coalition in the international community was in favor of securing 
that the monies freed from debt payments would be used for poverty reduction and for 
achieving the MDGs. Combined with the urge for recipient country ownership, this led to the 
idea that countries would have to elaborate a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper with broad 
participation of civil society in order to access the debt relief. The PRSP would serve both as 
a guarantee that country policies would be focused on poverty reduction, and as means to 
secure - broad - national ownership over policies.  
 
                                                 
2 See, for example, (Hansen & Tarp, 2000; Lensink & White, 1999) 
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The partnership principle of the PRSP approach involved that, once a broad based national 
plan would be in place, donors would support this plan and this would reduce the need to 
design and implement separate projects. This would also address some other problems of the 
aid architecture (see Figure 1), namely the high transaction costs of project aid, especially for 
recipient countries, and the fact that all the different implementation units and aid monitoring 
systems undermined national systems of planning, implementation, and monitoring. Several 
high level meetings (Rome 2003, Paris 2005 and Accra 2008) confirmed the commitments of 
both donors and recipient countries to adhere to some principles of aid effectiveness. These 
commitments were most clearly stated in the Paris Declaration: ownership, alignment, 
harmonization, a results orientation and mutual accountability. The move from project aid to 
program aid (budget support) was expected to help achieving these principles. 
 
In sum, the new aid paradigm consists of more selectivity in the aid allocation, the promoting 
of PRSPs as basis for ownership of the aid process, and the application of the principles of the 
Paris Declaration with budget support as the champion aid modality. However, the new aid 
approach suffers from internal contradictions and leaves a number of problems unaddressed. 
These errors of commission and omission will now be discussed.  
 
Contradictions 
The principles of the PRSP and the Paris Declaration represent the dominant perspective on 
the problems with aid and the need for a new paradigm, but there is also another “narrative” 
behind the new aid paradigm - one that reflects a more negative view of the aid recipient  
(Renard, 2005). From this second perspective, aid failed because of inadequate policies and 
governance in the recipient countries. Following this view, conditionality did not work 
because donors were too lenient with governments. This leads to the conclusion that donors 
should keep and even strengthen policy conditionality. Both perspectives on conditionality 
and ownership circulate in the donor community and sometimes even within one donor 
agency. This is what Rogerson (2005) calls the “schizophrenia” of the aid industry: 
conditionality is still important in aid practices, yet the Paris Declaration is completely silent 
about it (Rogerson, 2005).  
 
The ownership principle is perhaps the most important element of the new aid paradigm, but 
also the most confusing one. Donors often seem to define ownership as commitment to the 
preferred policies of the donors. However, real ownership implies that countries have control 
over their own policies; that they are in the driver seat (Whitfield, 2009b). This view is also 
present among academics. Martens, for example, writes that there can only be full ownership 
if the preferences of recipient countries are aligned with donor preferences (Martens, 2008). It 
can also be questioned whether ‘ex post’ selectivity indeed means less conditionality and 
more ownership. Countries badly in need of aid will try to improve on the selection criteria 
for the aid allocation. This implies that conditionality continues and perhaps even intensifies. 
 
Applying the principles of the Paris Declaration is assumed to enhance aid effectiveness, but 
it is not recognized that effectiveness is a value laden concept. Ideas on what the desired 
effects are may differ. Similarly, the “results orientation” of the Paris Declaration and of the 
PRSP approach assumes that donors and recipients have the same objective function and wish 
to see the same results. However, the donor’s constituencies are not homogeneous, and 
therefore one donor has multiple objectives (Martens, 2008; Svensson, 2008). A large number 
of donors have even more different objectives. The desire to show aid results to (different) 
domestic constituencies therefore also hampers donor harmonization (Knack & Rahman, 
2004). 
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Assuming all differences in preferences between donors and recipients away, most of the 
principles of the Paris Declaration deal with aid efficiency: alignment to national priorities and 
using national systems, and lowering transaction costs. However, transaction costs exists 
precisely because donors want to secure spending and implementation in line with their 
preferences (Martens, 2008). In this sense, there is a trade-off between effectiveness and 
efficiency. 
 
Some of these contradictions were already evident in some aspects of the design of the new 
aid approach. Although broad-based and national ownership of PRSPs was considered 
important, donors at the same time wanted PRSPs to further the achievement of the MDGs. 
MDGs have been criticized for being not sufficiently country-specific. In this respect, 
countries were not completely free in setting their own priorities (Renard, 2005). Ownership 
of PRSPs was further undermined by the fact that they had to be “endorsed”, in fact, 
approved, by the World Bank and the IMF, so this reduced the possibility of real ownership, 
or ownership in the sense of control over policies by recipient governments.  
 
Another tension of the new appraoch was related to the requirement of broad-based 
ownership of PRSPs, based on participation of civil society. Some considered this to be 
process conditionality, which would be better than content conditionality.3 In fact, if - elected 
- governments are not in favor of participation, “broad-based ownership” is a contradiction in 
terms. It was also not very clear what “participation” implied; whether it would just be 
consultation without any consequences, or whether civil society needed to have influence on 
the strategies. In the latter case, questions could be raised on the representativeness of civil 
society and on the relation of these processes with elected parliaments (Molenaers & Renard, 
2003). 
 
PRSPs were supposed to be comprehensive long-term strategies to reduce poverty, and at the 
same time to be sufficiently operational to guide aid efforts and to translate in annual 
government budgets. In line with this, one of the indicators for ownership in the Paris 
Declaration is that partner countries have “operational strategies”. However, translating a 
long-term overall vision into concrete activities and budgets is almost impossible. 
Establishing such a link between comprehensive plans and annual budgets has already been 
tried several times in history, for example in the Planning Programming and Budgeting 
System in the United States in the 1960s (Gunsteren, 1976). It has never succeeded. 
Furthermore, creating technocratic long-term plans for the whole economy and society is 
apolitical and unrealistic. The attempt at rational planning assumes that there is no politics 
involved in decisions on policy priorities, and that implementation is automatic once the plan 
has been approved. In reality, policies are determined in political processes involving short-
term negotiations and compromises between different viewpoints. Implementation processes 
are therefore never automatic; they are influenced by political motivations and incentives and 
by changed circumstances. Central planning has proved to be inefficient and has long been 
abandoned in OECD countries; yet, it is still very popular among aid experts. 
Errors of omission 
 
There are two other fundamental problems with the new aid paradigm. First, looking at the 
problems of the international aid architecture and their responses (Figure 1), one problem 
                                                 
3 They implicitly assumed that content conditionality was absent - which was not the case given the need for 
endorsement of the strategies. 
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conspicuously remains unaddressed. That is the low economic growth rates resulting from 
structural adjustment programs. Although particular conditions were not always carried out 
fully and immediately, most aid dependent countries began to adopt gradually the policies as 
prescribed by IMF and World Bank. They reduced government expenditure, liberalized 
domestic markets and foreign trade, privatized state-owned enterprises, first in production but 
then also in public utilities, and some also liberalized their capital accounts. But by the end of 
the1980s, structural adjustment policies came under increasing critique. They did not have 
sufficient attention for social policies so that social indicators deteriorated,4 and they were not 
conducive for growth. 
 
There is increasing evidence that that IMF programs have not led to economic growth, also if 
controlled for the “selection bias”5 (Barro & Lee, 2005; Easterly, 2005; Przeworski & 
Vreeland, 2000; Vreeland, 2007). The World Bank also recognized that its growth policies 
have not always been successful (World Bank, 2005), although one econometric study reports 
somewhat better results for the Word Bank than for the IMF (Butkiewicz & Yanikkaya, 
2005).  
 
The critique on the all-out liberalization and privatization of economies also came from 
economists who studied the history of development and more in particular the Asian 
experience (Amsden, 1989; Amsden, 2007; Chang, 2002; Chang, 2007). The currently 
developed countries have all used a lot more state intervention than developing countries are 
now allowed to practice. The new aid paradigm with its emphasis on MDGs and poverty 
reduction detracted the attention from these fundamental criticisms on the growth enhancing 
nature of standard policy prescriptions. 
 
A second unaddressed problem is related to the limits to the absorption capacity for aid. 
The new aid paradigm stresses that the lack of donor coordination and lack of alignment with 
country systems increases transaction costs and undermines local capacity. There is ample 
evidence that the lack of donor coordination does bring about high costs for recipient 
countries (Acharya, Lima, & Moore, 2006; Knack & Rahman, 2004). Knack and Rahman 
(2004) also examined the effect of donor fragmentation6 on the quality of governace in a 
sample of 96 countries, and found that it is negative and significant. In Sub-Saharan countries, 
donor fragmentation proved to weaken the quality of governance even more. Yet, even full 
donor harmonization is no guarantee for aid effectiveness, as the Dutch involvement in 
Surinam has shown. And even with full harmonization and alignment, a large volume of aid is 
still likely to undermine national capacities. 
 
Econometric studies on aid effectiveness show highly varying results, but there is some a 
consensus that aid has a small positive effect on growth (Radelet & Levine, 2008). Yet, there 
is an increasing number of fairly robust studies showing diminishing returns (Hansen & Tarp, 
2001; Hansen & Tarp, 2001; Rajan & Subramanian, 2005). The pleas for “scaling up” (Sachs, 
2005) consistently ignore these effects. 
 
The literature suggests that the negative effects of large volumes of aid may be due to 
economic, or to institutional and political factors. On the economic side, aid may increase the 
real exchange rate and produce harmful effects on the country’s exports, although economists 
disagree on the extent to which this occurs (Serieux, 2007). Another negative economic 
                                                 
4 At an early stage already recognized by Cornia et al. (Cornia, Jolly, & Stewart, 1987). 
5 The fact that IMF programs are implemented in countries with low growth. 
6 Measured as the reverse of concentration, (1 - Herfindahl index). 
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effects of aid is that it may reduce the efforts to raise taxes, the so-called “fiscal response” 
(White, 1998). 
 
However, the institutional and political effects are potentially even more harmful. Aid may 
reduce domestic efforts to foster development.7 The aid system has in-built perverse 
incentives. At a macro level, the country can only receive aid if its income per capita remains 
low. But similar effects are likely to happen at lower levels. If the auditor general office spent 
the money meant for doing audits by raising salaries, donors respond by giving more aid.8 In 
numerous cases, perverse behavior of recipients is rewarded, not punished. Perverse effects 
are also visible in the labor market. Donor agencies distract staff from the government and 
from the private sector by offering higher salaries and a more rewarding working 
environment. This weakens the state sector and reduces incentives for building up a vibrant 
private sector. 
 
In addition, attention has been raised for the possibility that large amounts of aid to 
governments reduce domestic accountability. Government officers dedicate most of their time 
and effort to render accounts to the donors. As long as a large part of government income 
“falls from heaven”, parliaments and the population at large do not have incentives to monitor 
how governments spend this money (Killick & Foster, 2007; Moss, Petterson, & Walle, 2006; 
Moyo, 2009). It is only when taxes are raised, that populations demand voice. These issues 
receive very little attention in the new aid paradigm - with one exception. One of the hoped-
for secondary effects of budget support is precisely to increase domestic accountability. The 
donors require reports on government policies and government expenditure and they hope that 
this more transparent reporting will be used by civil society and parliaments in order to hold 
their governments to account. It remains to be seen whether this is the case. 
 
 
3. Selectivity 
 
This section aims to answer the question whether donors have become more selective in their 
aid allocation, what the selection criteria have been and what the likely results of the applied 
selectivity are. In particular, it is important to examine whether the selection criteria can be 
expected to have been helpful for growth. 
 
For the situation before 2000, several studies concluded that high debts, and especially high 
multilateral debts, were an important factor determining the aid level (Birdsall, Claessens, & 
Diwan, 2003; Cordella, Ricci, & Ruiz-Arranz, 2005; Hernández & Katada, 1996; Marchesi & 
Missale, 2004). Both IMF and World Bank lent into arrears, thereby allowing countries to 
repay earlier debts. Once countries had an IMF agreement, other donors were also more likely 
to provide aid (Dijkstra, 2008). One study even concluded that there was adverse selection: 
countries with poor policies, as measured by the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
of the World Bank (CPIA), were given more aid until 1999 (Birdsall et al., 2003). 
 
Several studies have examined whether aid has become more selective after around 1999. 
They use different methods, and often also examine different criteria, including different 
indicators for poverty, good policies and good governance. Dollar and Levin look at the 
influence of two measures for good governance, the rule of law (ICRG) and democracy 
(Freedom House Index), as well as of poverty (GDP per capita) and several control variables. 
                                                 
7 See also Svensson (2008). 
8 This occurred in Nicaragua, for example. 
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They compare the most recent period 2000-2003 with earlier periods from 1984 onwards. All 
donors proved to provide more aid to the poorer countries and total aid was selective on 
democracy but not on rule of law. There was no evidence of increased selectivity, except for 
the multilateral donors but this already started in 1995-1999 (Dollar & Levin, 2006). 
 
Nunnenkamp and Thiele (2006) showed that the poverty allocation of aid from all DAC 
donors deteriorated in the most recent period (1999-2002) as compared to the 1980s. In 
theory, this could be due to a larger flow to countries with good governance. However, they 
also found that aid did not prioritize countries with better scores on the World Bank’s Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). Multilateral donors as group did not perform 
better than the average donor. They also found that donors did not give more aid to countries 
of which the governance score improved between 1996 and 2002.9
 
Hout examines the aid allocation of three donors that have officially announced that they 
would become more selective on good governance: the World Bank, in particular IDA, The 
Netherlands, and the USA for its Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). The World Bank 
and the Netherlands give a heavy weight to economic policies in their allocation decisions, 
while political criteria have a heavier weight in the MCA. He uses the six governance 
indicators composed by Kaufmann, Kraaij and Mastruzzi of the World Bank Institute, as well 
as a composite variable based on principal components analysis. This analysis shows that 
governance, especially the composite variable, is an important determinant of aid in all three 
cases. However, the significance disappears for the second period (2002-2006) in The 
Netherlands, in line with qualitative evidence of reduced selectivity (Hout, 2007). 
 
10A recent study examined the selectivity of aid (and debt relief)  among a group of 62 low-
income countries from 1989 to 2003 (Depetris Chauvin and Kraay, 2006). While they find 
that in the first five-year period (1989-1993) countries with worse policies (measured by the 
CPIA) received more aid, this was reversed in the last (1999-2003). This seems to indicate 
that selectivity in the aid allocation has improved since 1999.  
 
The evidence on selectivity is not very conclusive, but what is clear is that the IDA allocation 
has become more selective on the CPIA and possibly also on governance. For the World Bank 
this is not surprising, as it uses the CPIA in order to allocate its loans and grants since 1998, 
along with a measure of poverty and of the size of the population. The CPIA contains four 
clusters, and together they represent both “good policies” and “good governance”. Other 
criteria also play a role, such as poverty (income per capita), population size, and past 
portfolio performance. But the weight of the CPIA is 16 times the weight of poverty and 
twice the weight of the population (Van Waeyenberghe, 2009). The governance cluster in the 
CPIA has a double weight as compared to the other clusters, because it is also used as a 
separate governance factor. Since 2005, both the criteria and the country scores (at least for 
IDA countries) have become public. This is beneficial for the transparency of the World Bank 
but at the same time it gives the World Bank’s standards and criteria more leverage: it is 
likely that aid dependent countries will attempt to improve their scores in order to receive a 
higher share of the IDA allocation. 
 
                                                 
9 Using the control of corruption and rule of law scores among the Kaufmann et al. governance indicators of the 
World Bank Institute.(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2004). 
10 I exclude the results for debt relief; a stock measure of debt forgiveness was used in this study, which does not 
say anything on the flow effects of debt relief (A. G. Dijkstra, 2008) 
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Selectivity on what? 
The question then is what are the good policies and good governance criteria that the World 
Bank uses? In the policy area, it was expected that the renewed attention for poverty of the 
new aid paradigm would give a higher priority to social policies. In addition, it has been 
claimed that there is now a “Post Washington consensus” that would eliminate the strongest 
pro-market biases of the earlier structural adjustment policies. With respect to governance, the 
question is whether the governance criteria included in the CPIA indeed promote economic 
growth. 
 
The CPIA contains clusters on economic management, structural policies, social inclusion, 
and a governance cluster called “public sector management and institutions”.  The first two 
clusters are still reflecting the Washington Consensus, rewarding low inflation, a budget 
surplus, free trade and free capital flows, flexible goods, labor and land markets, market-
determined interest rates and absence of directed credit, equal treatment of foreign investors, 
protection of shareholder rights, capital account convertibility and open public sector 
procurement. This precludes strategic interventions that have proven to be so important in the 
now developed countries (Amsden, 2007; Chang, 2002). 
 
The 2004 CPIA, however, shows changes in the structural policies cluster, in particular in the 
questionnaire (the “narrative guidelines”) that is used by the country experts having to do the 
scoring. Free flows of capital and equal treatment of foreign investors are no longer 
mentioned, and directed credit is no longer banned. However, Van Waeyenberge (2009) also 
examined the “guideposts” to the scoring exercise, which have become more extensive after 
the changes in the “narrative guidelines”. These “guideposts” refer extensively to World Bank 
diagnostic reports such as Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies, Investment Climate 
Assessments, Administrative Barrier Reports, financial sector assessments. These reports and 
assessments fully reflect the biases of the “old” Washington Consensus. The contents of these 
reports therefore eliminates the changes introduced in the narrative guidelines (Van 
Waeyenberghe, 2009). 
 
The cluster “Policies for social inclusion” includes gender equality, equality of public 
resource used, building human resources, social protection and labor, and policies and 
institutions for environmental sustainability. Some of these policies are constrained by the 
macro-economic policies of the first cluster or they are in contradiction with structural 
policies that prescribe, for example, an easy hiring firing of labor (Van Waeyenberghe, 2009: 
800). 
 
The cluster on governance contains property rights and rule-based governance, quality of 
budgetary and financial management, efficiency of revenue mobilization, quality of public 
administration, and transparency, accountability and corruption in the public sector. The big 
question is whether these policies and institutions are necessary for economic development 
and for aid effectiveness. Several authors have shown the now developed countries started to 
grow with a level of institutional development that was much lower than that of the current 
developing countries (Chang, 2002; Goldsmith, 2007). This allows for the possibility that 
these institutions are induced by a higher level of development. The evidence for the a causal 
link from a high score on the Kaufmann indicators to economic growth, is weak (Khan, 2006; 
Kurtz & Schrank, 2007).  
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Khan distinguishes between market-enhancing governance and growth enhancing governance 
(Khan, 2006). The current orthodoxy as reflected in the CPIA11 holds that market-enhancing 
governance is necessary for growth, but that need not be the case. In Khan’s view, the 
problems of catching up require governance that addresses the market failures that maintain 
low productivity in developing countries. This involves a lot more strategic government 
intervention than the market enhancing governance allows for. Other authors also criticize the 
rigid way in which the orthodox good governance criteria are defined. There are many ways 
in which property rights can be protected, for example (Andrews, 2008). It is also possible 
that in an imperfect environment, the application of international best practices for one 
institution leads to suboptimal or even worse outcomes for economic growth, for example, 
when setting up or reforming a formal institution weakens or destroys earlier informal 
institutions (Rodrik, 2008). Similarly, it may be dangerous or too costly to attempt to 
implement many reforms at the same time (Grindle, 2004). 
 
In sum, using the CPIA as selection criterion is not likely to promote growth. This means that 
the selection criteria for IDA loans and grants are still dominated by criteria that, if applied, 
do not foster growth in these aid dependent countries. Given that there is increasing 
harmonization among donors on the selection criteria, this is a dangerous development.   
 
 
4. PRSPs  
 
The elaboration of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers was a requirement for access to the 
HIPC Initiative. It also became condition for the new IMF facility for low income countries 
(PRGF) and for the IDA (World Bank) development policy loans for low income countries, 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Credits (PRSCs). Furthermore, the elaboration of a national 
poverty reduction or development plan that would form the basis for development aid has 
become a condition for most donors.  
 
Since 2000, 60 countries have elaborated a full PRSP, including many low income countries 
and also several also middle income countries. Several countries produced a second and some 
even a third strategy.12 Most countries with a PRSP have presented Annual Progress Reports 
(APR) as well, although no country managed to do this annually. These sixty countries 
presented in total 100 PRSPs and 92 Progress Reports. In this respect, the PRSP has been 
implemented widely.  
 
In the remainder of this section, I briefly summarize the evidence to date on the PRS process, 
focussing in particular on the degree of ownership of the strategies and on the extent to which 
they have contributed to the implementaiton of poverty reduction policies. 
 
Although countries usually did not take the initiative for writing PRSPs, PRSPs may still be 
nationally owned. The degree of ownership of the strategies depends on the size of the circle 
of local actors that have a “perception of possession” of the strategy (Stewart and Wang, 
2003). This perception may be limited to the group of technocrats who designed the strategy, 
may include the top political leadership or key political officers such as the Vice-President or 
the Minister of Finance. Ownership is broader if other ministers are involved, and even more 
if this ownership is extended to all public sector officers. Finally, ownership is really broad-
                                                 
11 And for example, also in the Kaufmann indicators. 
12 Source for these data on approved PRSPs and APRs: www.worldbank.org, accessed 23 January 2010. 
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based if it extends beyond the executive, including a majority in parliament, opposition 
parties, civil society organizations and the public at large.13
 
Most studies of the original PRSPs that were elaborated in order to qualify for the HIPC 
initiative (the “first generation” of PRSPs) conclude that ownership was fairly limited. It 
usually included the group of technocrats writing the strategy plus some key political leaders - 
those who were most interested in accessing the debt relief. Ownership among other 
policymakers such as the line ministries was limited (Booth, 2005; Dijkstra, 2005; Driscoll & 
Evans, 2005; Holtom, 2007; Whitfield, 2005; Woll, 2008). Parliaments were seldom involved 
and often were hardly aware of the existence of PRSPs. The fact that the strategy had to be 
approved by World Bank and IMF limited the possibilities for ownership and thus also for 
ownership among the wider society (IEO, 2004; OED, 2004). 
 
In Latin American HIPC countries, new governments were elected soon after the first PRSPs 
had been approved (G. Dijkstra, 2005). These new governments rejected the “old” strategy, 
but as Honduras and Nicaragua had not reached the Completion Point for the HIPC initiative 
yet, governments of these countries continued to write Progress Reports and began to work on 
new or revised plans. Only in Nicaragua this led to an approved second PRSP which was 
strongly owned by the executive government of the day, but it was soon to be rejected by yet 
another new elected government. The evidence on ownership of second or third strategies for 
Sub Saharan Africa is not very extensive. In Ghana, donors interfered much less in the 
elaboration of these strategies (Woll, 2008). They were not so much interested in the contents 
of the strategies, but much more in the show (the PRS process) going on. In Uganda, high-
level political ownership of the most recent (2005) strategy was lower than in the two 
previous strategies (1997 and 2001). This is explained by the fact that the two earlier 
strategies had a higher budget and could include high-profile and politically attractive 
measures, such as free education and health care (Canagarajah & Diesen, 2006). 
 
With respect to ownership among the larger population, most authors concur that the 
organized participation processes were, at best, a form of consultation (Gould, 2005; Lazarus, 
2008; Molenaers & Renard, 2003; Stewart & Wang, 2003; Vos, Cabezas, & Aviles, 2003). To 
the extent that civil society groups were invited to discussions at the national or regional level, 
the agenda was usually determined by the government. Discussions hardly ever extended to 
macro-economic policies or structural reforms. Useful participation was also limited because 
invitations and relevant documents did not arrive in time, or civil society constrained itself as 
it had an interest in receiving debt relief (IOB, 2003).  
 
In Bolivia extensive consultations were held, but there was a huge gap between the outcomes 
of these discussions and the later strategy, which was written by a group of technocrats with 
inputs from line ministry officers and donors (Komives, Aguilar, Larrea, & Dijkstra, 2003) 
.This points to the difficulty of integrating many and widely diverging detailed demands in a 
national strategy - both practically, and politically. This gap between consultations and plan 
content also held for the consultations held for some second generation PRSPs. In Uganda 
and Tanzania, for example, extensive grass roots consultation processes were held, financed 
by donors. This led to thousands of pages of reports and that was far too much to be used in 
the actual strategies (Canagarajah & Diesen, 2006; Hartog, 2005). Actual influence was 
therefore limited. 
                                                 
13 This is loosely based on the classification in Booth (2003). 
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Implementation 
In order to assess the influence of the strategies for actual poverty reduction policies, it is 
important to examine first the contents of the strategies and then the extent of their 
implementation. The contents of the strategies proved to reflect the then dominant 
international poverty agenda: macro-economic stability, market liberalization, attention for 
good governance, and a focus on social sectors and social protection mechanisms (Craig & 
Porter, 2003; Stewart & Wang, 2003). In so far as growth policies were included, they 
stressed macro-economic stabilization with limited flexibility for addressing shocks or for 
expanding social expenditure (Gottschalk, 2005) This is another proof of limited country 
ownership, but also of continued dominance of the Washington Consensus in so far as growth 
policies were concerned. Donors usually complained about the heavy focus on social policies 
in the first PRSPs and on the lack of attention for policies to increase growth, and this also 
came out evaluations (IEO, 2004; OED, 2004). However, it was usually donor influence that 
led to this focusing on social policies and neglect of economic growth in the first place. 
 
The attention for growth was usually better in second or third strategies, again showing that 
countries listed well to their financiers. But apart from a somewhat higher priority for 
physical infrastructure, growth policies did not become very concrete (Canagarajah and 
Diesen, 2006; Woll, 2008). Given the constraints of the still dominant Washington consensus, 
it was of course difficult for countries to design specific growth promoting policies. In 
Nicaragua, the second PRSP, owned by the executive, did promote growth but neglected 
equity (Guimarães & Avendaño, 2007).  
  
Most PRSPs were hardly implemented. Implementation was limited to policies that were 
already under way before the PRSP started, to donor-financed projects and to some political 
measures with high-level support, such as free education (“Universal Primary Education” in 
Uganda). A first problem was that PRSPs suffered from a lack of priority setting and of 
operationalization and costing of policies. In several countries (for example Ghana, 
Nicaragua) costing exercises were only available for projects that were to be financed by the 
donors. The 2006 OECD Survey on the implementation of the Paris Declaration shows that 
no country had achieved “good practice” in making operational sterategies, and that only 5 
out of 34 countries (17%) had “largely developed toward good practice.” (OECD, 2008: 17). 
Most national development strategies still lacked realistic costing of and prioritization of 
activities.  
 
Another often mentioned problem is that there were only weak links between the PRSPs and 
the processes of formulation and approval of government budgets. These processes 
themselves were still weak. Donor attempts to reform public financial management, for 
example by introducing MTEFs, performance management and activity based costing are far 
too complicated and “drain available capacity”. In practice, improvements were sometimes 
observed in budget formulation, but budget execution and accountability remained weak.14 
Although several African countries developed Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks, these 
MTEFs are sometimes only existing on paper and do not provide real budget constraints, as in 
Mozambique (Cheru, 2006). Budgets are often just a “façade” (Rakner, Mukubvu, Ngwira, 
Smiddy, & Schneider, 2004). In Ghana, there proved to be an almost 50 per cent difference 
                                                 
14 Dorotinsly and Floyd 2004, cited in Renzio (2006). 
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between budgeted expenditure and actual expenditure per ministry, on average (Lawson et al., 
2007). 
 
All in all, PRSPs largely remained a paper exercise. This was not only due to limited domestic 
ownership, but also to the practical impossibility to link technocratic, comprehensive, long-
term plans with concrete day-to-day political decisions. It is also unrealistic to assume that a 
long-run consensus on how poverty must be dealt with can exist at all. Actual policies and 
actual spending have far more to do with complex political negotiations in a context of 
continuing neo-patrimonial relationships, than with PRSPs or approved budgets. Gould 
concludes on the basis of a study of PRSP processes in several countries that there are two 
“disjunctures”: between policy and politics, and between policy formulation and 
implementation (Gould, 2005). In my view, the two are related. While donors and some top 
technocratic officers are working on the formal documents (PRSP) and negotiate PRSCs and 
performance assessment matrices for budget support, the political process in which actual 
policies and spending are determined is an entirely different matter. Formal processes are 
more like a virtual reality that has little to do with actual policy making and spending 
decisions. 
 
 
5. The Paris Declaration and moves to budget support 
 
Now we get to the crux of the new aid paradigm, the introduction of the five principles of the 
Paris Declaration: ownership, not just of a PRSP or national strategy, but of actual policies 
and of the aid process, alignment with country priorities and systems, donor harmonization, 
managing for results and mutual accountability. To what extent are these principles applied? 
This section answers that question, and looks at the aid modality that is supposed to advance 
these principles most, namely budget support. 
 
In view of the importance attached to the principles of the Paris Declaration, the OECD 
carried out a large survey among 34 aid receiving countries on the application of the 
principles in 2006 (OECD, 2008). In particular, the 12 targets of the Declaration were 
monitored. The results show that there has been some progress, but that is unlikely that the 
targets for 2010 will be met. This conclusion is in line with findings of other studies (Booth, 
2005; Driscoll and Evans, 2005; Cheru, 2006; Dijkstra & Komives, 2008). It is interesting to 
analyze some of the targets examined in the survey and their outcomes in more detail. 
 
For ownership and leadership of the aid process, the survey looked at whether countries had 
operational national development strategies, and whether governments had set up sector 
working groups in which donors and governments discuss and coordinate policies for a sector. 
The survey concludes that national strategies were not sufficiently operational (see above), 
and that sector working groups were often established in health and education, but much less 
so in other sectors. However, it can seriously be questioned whether these two issues are valid 
indicators for ownership. Industrialized countries seldom have national, operational 
development strategies and yet they certainly own their policies. Furthermore, the existence of 
sector working groups in which donors are involved in sector policies was found to actually 
reduce ownership (Whitfield, 2009a).  
 
With respect to alignment, between 38% and 98% of aid was reported to be on budget. Actual 
disbursements were often much larger than aid included in the budget. Countries with an 
MTEF found it impossible to get reliable predictions of donor disbursements in years n+1 or 
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n+2. Only about 40% of on-budget aid used country public finance management and 
procurement systems, and parallel implementation units were still widespread.15 Another 
finding is that there proved to be hardly a link between the use of these systems and their 
quality. In the area of harmonization, the survey examines progress towards program-based 
approaches (see below) and towards joint missions (18% of total) and joint analytical work 
(somewhat higher at 42%). For “managing for results”, the survey examined the result 
orientation of performance assessment frameworks and finds that there is moderate progress 
towards best practices. For “mutual accountability” it was registered whether a mechanism is 
in place for mutual review of progress on the Paris Declaration principles, which was the case 
in 44% of countries. However, the indicators for “managing for results” and for “mutual 
accountability” only partially seem to cover the original ideas. 
 
Measuring the extent to which there were program-based approaches proved to be a 
challenge. This is partly due to the vague way in which these approaches are defined, for 
example tehre should be “efforts to increase the use of local systems…”. The survey 
attempted to count aid within program-based approaches but also registered the easier 
category of budget support, defined as non-earmarked aid. It is true that non-earmarked aid by 
definition is fully aligned, but it need not be fully harmonized. The Survey found that 43% of 
aid was delivered in program-based approaches, which is still far away from the target of 66% 
in 2010. Within program-based approaches, budget support proved to be 20% of total aid, on 
average. 
  
This number is in line with other studies. According to the most recent (2007) Annual Survey 
of Budget Support undertaken for the SPA, the number of donors involved in joint general 
budget support agreements in Africa has increased between 2004 and 2007. All fourteen 
countries reviewed in this Survey received General Budget Support, and by 2007, 11 out of 
14 have a formal joint Memorandum of Understanding for its provision. But the amount of 
GBS is still small relative to total aid to these countries: 21 per cent, on average. If we add 
sector budget support,16 the share of these two modalities becomes 24 per cent (SPA BSWG, 
2008). 
 
In three reviewed Latin American countries (Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua), a joint 
framework for budget support existed only for one year in Bolivia and for a longer period 
(2005-2009) in Nicaragua. The share of unearmarked aid (including balance of payment 
support – especially important in Bolivia in 2003-4) in total aid constituted only 15%, on 
average in these three countries. This was much lower than the 22% share of freely spendable 
aid (“program aid”, mainly balance of payments support) in total aid provided over the years 
1995-2000 (Dijkstra and Komives, 2008). It can be expected that this also holds for many 
other countries receiving budget support. Despite the rhetoric of the new aid paradigm, the 
share of freely spendable aid in total aid may actually have decreased as compared to the 
1990s, instead of increased.  
 
While donors increasingly talk and study the advancement of the Paris Declaration principles 
of harmonization and alignment, these efforts appear an uphill struggle in view of changing 
realities. In recent years, donor coordination became increasingly difficult due to the entrance 
of new donors and new programs. First, the number of donors increased due to new countries 
entering the European Union. Countries such as the Czech Republic and Hungary, in their 
desire to comply with EU guidelines, started to enter the donor scene. They may be wiling to 
                                                 
15 The average recipient country had 54 of them (1832/34). 
16 This is also unearmarked aid, but with policy conditions for a specific sector. 
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adhere to the Paris Declaration principles, but their entrance makes coordination more 
difficult. Second, several non OECD/DAC donors are becoming increasingly important, like 
China and Venezuela. These donors do not feel constrained by the Paris Decalaration 
principles at all. They follow their own policies and conclude direct bilateral contracts with 
recipients. 
 
Third, the drive towards increasing aid and increasing aid effectiveness has brought about 
new global aid initiatives, including the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI), 
the Global Fund against Aids, Tubercolusis and Malaria (GFATM), and the President’s (Bush) 
Emergency Plan For Aids Relief (PEPFAR). The Millennium Challenge Account (MCC) of 
the United States may also be classified in this group because it was aimed at increasing aid 
effectiveness by selecting countries with good governance only. These initiatives all have 
their own disbursement, implementation and monitoring procedures, implying that they 
bypass country systems for planning, implementation and monitoring. Each new concern of 
the international community (HIV/AIDS, governance, climate change) seems to bring about 
more donor proliferation.17
 
A preliminary evaluation of some of these initiatives (MCC, GFATM, and GAVI) shows that 
they do well on the Paris Declaration principle results orientation, focusing on concrete 
objectives and applying performance-based disbursement. But they do less well on country 
ownership, alignment and harmonization (Radelet & Levine, 2008). In a country like Uganda 
the total aid from global health initiatives was US$ 160 million over 3 years (2004/5 to 
2006/7). This aid was completely off-budget and was mostly provided to the private sector. 
This hampers a proper health planning by the government (Nabyonga Orem, Ssengooba, & 
Okuonzi, 2009). 
 
Budget support 
Donors that are in favour of providing budget support claim that they only start this modality 
if certain conditions are fulfilled in a recipient country. The country must have macro-
economic stability, the government must be committed to poverty reduction, meet minimum 
standards with respect to government budgeting and accounting, and have good governance, 
implying also that it respects democratic principles and human rights. Countries seldom meet 
al these conditions. Most current donor darlings are weak democracies with limited checks 
and balances, high degrees of corruption and of clientelism. As donors were desperately 
willing to start budget support, this had two consequences. 
 
First, they resorted in practice to relatively simple selection criteria. These usually included 
that the IMF agreement should be on track, as measure of macro-economic stability, and there 
should be an approved PRSP as indicator for commitment with poverty reduction. 
Governance criteria or real (other than token) commitment to poverty reduction hardly played 
a role. Second, they began to use budget support to bring about the desired changes in 
governance, public finance management and poverty policies.  
 
The fact that the IMF is still the primary entrance condition, maintains the pivotal role of this 
institution in determining economic policies. This is odd, as most poor countries nowadays do 
not suffer from short-term macro-economic instability or balance of payments problems. 
These governments are convinced that low budget deficits and low inflation are important, 
                                                 
17 To date, there are already 18 different funds for climate change (ODI blog by Geoff Handley, accessed 26 
February 2010, http://blogs.odi.org.uk/blogs/main/archive/2009/02/26/7085.aspx 
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and they by and large succeeded – at least until the economic crisis of 2008-9 – in 
maintaining macro-economic stability. However, this requirement of the budget support 
donors implies that even countries that do not have balance of payments or debt problems 
need an IMF agreement. The IMF created the Policy Support Instrument (PSI) to that aim; a 
regularly monitored IMF program without money. 
 
Looking at the contents of IMF programs, the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) 
concluded that the IMF still includes many structural benchmarks.18 In addition, it did not 
prioritize poverty reduction policies and did not start offering the country alternative policy 
proposals (IEO, 2007). Some other authors maintain that the IMF has “streamlined” its 
conditionality, focusing more on issues directly related to fiscal and financial policies 
(Radelet & Levine, 2008). To the extent this is the case, the World Bank has taken over many 
of the other structural conditions from the IMF, already in its selection criteria for IDA (see 
above) but also in the policy dialogue. 
 
Apart from the selection or entrance criteria donors also influence policies and governance in 
the policy dialogue around budget support. Compared to the conditionality of program aid in 
the 1990s, more donors now participate in the policy dialogue and conditions have extended 
to cover all sectors of government policy and government institutions. Donors define concrete 
policies and targets to be achieved with budget support. In many cases, these policies and 
targets are defined in a common framework, a Performance Assessment Matrix or 
Framework, which is negotiated with the government. Officially, the policies and targets are 
derived from the PRSP or other national plans. But in practice these plans are not sufficiently 
operational. Donors attempt to micromanage all sectors of government policy, from public 
finance management via the judiciary to social services and water and sanitation. The extent 
of national ownership of all these policies and targets can be questioned. 
 
In addition, the conditions and procedures of donors witin budget support are not fully 
harmonized. Some donors, in particular the World Bank, define specific actions, “triggers”, 
that must be carried out in order for disbursements to follow. The European Commission 
defines specific outcomes that must be achieved for part of the money to flow.19 Bilateral 
donors also have specific actions or targets within the joint framework tat are more important 
than others. Most importantly, all donors have different levels of tolerance for different 
governance issues. Although the governance situation was not very good in most countries, 
donors tend to respond to deteriorations in governance by suspending the money. As a result, 
the annual amounts of budget support usually fluctuate a lot. All aid suffers from fluctuations, 
but low predictability of budget support is more likely to affect macro-economic stability.  
 
Some other expected advantages of budget support did come about (IDD and associates, 
2006). It seems that transaction cost have been reduced, and budget support fully uses local 
systems. The freely usable money has increased allocative efficieny of spending. In several 
countries, government budgeting and reporting systems have improved. But usually these 
improvements in public finance management predate budget support and can also be ascribed 
to large technical assistance programs (De Renzio, 2006). There is also evidence that 
governments have been able to spend more on poverty reduction policies (IDD and 
Associates, 2007; Komives & Dijkstra, 2006). However, in all cases the quality of this 
spending is in doubt. There is even some evidence of decreasing efficiency in the social 
sectors due to abundance of resources and lack of sufficient absorption capacity (Lawson, 
                                                 
18 The current PSI for Uganda, for example, includes a benchmark on the privatization of the pension system. 
19 This is the so-called variable tranch, which is determined by the degree of fulfillment of the defined targets.  
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Booth, Msuya, Wangwe, & Williamson, 2005).In general, it is as yet impossible to show that 
social indicators improved due to budget support. This means that as yet, little is known about 
the effectiveness of budget support for its ultimate objective, poverty reduction. 
 
The improvements in budgeting processes and in public finance management that were partly 
induced by budget support usually included increased transparency. Ministries of Finance 
often publish annual budgets on their websites. In Nicaragua, transparency also improved on 
actual expenditure, with quarterly reports on actual outturns also posted on the Ministry’s 
website. Civil society used this increased transparency in order to critically monitor the 
government – at least, until 2007 when a new government took office and transparency was 
reduced across the board. In Africa, increased transparency on budgets and policies does not 
always seem to have led to greater domestic accountability. In Tanzania it was found that civil 
society or parliaments did not show any interest in government information (Lawson et al., 
2005). 
 
6. Conclusions 
  
Widespread discontent with the results of aid at the turn of the millennium gave rise to new 
pleas for more aid and to a new aid approach. This new paradigm was expected to increase 
aid effectiveness through applying more selectivity in the aid allocation, having countries 
elaborate broadly owned national development strategies focused on poverty reduction, and 
by promoting donor harmonization and alignment, in particular through fostering the aid 
modality of budget support. 
 
The paper analyzed the theoretical merits of this new aid paradigm as well as the extent of 
implementation over the last 10 years and the results. The new aid approach proved to suffer 
from errors of commission and omission. Among the former, the most important internal 
contradiction was related to ownership. Ownership is assumed to be the result of selectivy, 
and is the first principle of both PRSPs and the Paris Declaration. However, it seems that all 
this is based on the premise that country and donor preferences are the same, in other words, 
that the country “owns”, or is committed to, what the donors want to achieve.  If this 
assumption falls down, conditionality will remain strong and/or harmonization and alignment  
are logically impossible. In both cases, the new aid paradigm is not likely to improve aid 
effectiveness. 
 
The errors of omission include, first, the fact that the new aid approach does not address the 
Washington’s Consensus failure to bring about economic growth. Second, it does not have an 
answer to the economic and institutional and political effects of aid that reduce the aborption 
capacity. No matter how well harmonized and aligned aid might be, these problems will 
persist. 
 
Overviewing the implementation of the new aid paradigm, these problems are largely 
confirmed. Some selectivity on governance and policies has been applied, mainly by the 
World Bank itself. Allocation decisions for IDA were heavilyt influenced by governance, 
along with policies. However, the contents of these selection criteria reflects the “old” 
Washington conensus policies, as well as “market enhancing” governance indicators rather 
than “growth enhancing” governance indicators (Kahn, 2006). The increased transparency of 
criteria and scores implies that they are likely to induce aid dependent countries to improve on 
them. This not only impies continued, and possibly even stronger conditionality, but also a 
continuation of imposed policies and governance that do not promote economic growth. 
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With 60 countries having presented a PRSP, this element of the new aid approach has 
certainly been implemented. However, the strategies failed in most of their assumed 
functions. They have not managed to bring about broad consensus in societies on policy 
priorities, they have been useless as “commitment device” and they also failed as operational 
plans that would guide government activities and expenditure. All this could have been 
expected, yet donors still adhere to this idea of elaborating comprehensive, rational and a-
political national plans. 
 
The ownership principle of the Paris Declaration is operationalized in such a way that it has 
little to do with ownership. Countries must have national and operational development 
strategies (this is a condition in itself and is logically impossible) and they must set up sector 
working groups in order to have donors co-decide on sector policies. This also undermines 
national ownership rather than fostering it. While real ownership is not taken seriously, 
progress on alignment to country systems and on harmonization is limited. Whatever progress 
is made on these fronts, it is almost undone by the appearance of new donors and new global 
initiatives. About 20% of aid is provided as non-earmarked resources (budget support). This 
most likely does not represent an increase over the share provided in the 1990s. Furthermore, 
this modality is accompanied by extensive conditionality. Conditions now affect more sectors, 
and the “policy dialogue” includes many more donors. The contents of macro-economic and 
structural policies has not changed as compared to earlier structural adjustment policies. 
 
In the name of the new aid approach, millions of aid dollars have been spent in getting 
countries to write PRSPs, organizing consultation processes for these strategies, having high 
level meetings on the principles of the Paris Declaration and on studying progress, but the 
basic problems of the aid architecture have not been addressed. First, aid dependent countries 
are still forced to apply Washington Consensus policies and governance that are not 
conducive for economic growth. This is seriously compromising whatever positive effects aid 
efforts may have. Second, the new aid paradigm with its talk on reducing transaction costs is 
based on the premise that donors and recipient countries have the same preferences. Given 
that this is not the case, either transaction costs are inevitable, or donors should provide (part 
of) aid to support recipient countries whatever their preferences are. Justifications for 
respecting sovereignty include compensation for the negative effects of colonialism, 
compensation for negative effects of current global economic relations or of climate change.20 
Third, the new aid approach does not address the decreasing returns to scale, which are most 
likely related to negative institutional and political effects of aid. Given that the principles of 
the Paris Declaration cannot possibly be implemented, these problems remain. Some 
countries simply get too much aid. This should be recognized and should lead to reductions.  
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